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This paper examines Japan's R&D performance since the early 1980s using several 
complementary modes of analysis. First, we examine evidence from aggregate economic 
statistics concerning changes in Japanese corporate R&D. Second, we analyze 
comprehensive data on R&D inputs and outputs for a panel of nearly 200 Japanese firms. 
Microeconometric analysis of this data set allows us to examine where any downturn in 
R&D activity is concentrated, what Japanese firms are themselves doing to rectify the  
downturn in performance, and what effects these steps have had to date. Third, we relate 
the results of interviews with corporate R&D managers and informed industry observers 
concerning their perceptions of changes in Japanese innovative capacity and the reasons 
for these changes. We find evidence, at the micro level and the aggregate level, of a 




I.   Introduction 
 During the 1980s, a major source of Japanese growth – and a major source of 
concern for Japan’s trading partners – was the widely admired innovative capacity of 
Japanese firms.  Over the course of this decade, Japanese firms entered and successfully 
competed in high-technology industries that had formerly been the preserve of U.S. and 
European multinationals.  Japanese firms’ expanding innovative capacity was clearly 
reflected in aggregate statistics on R&D expenses, patenting, and productivity, all of 
which showed a steady increase in R&D input and output.2  Technological leadership in a 
broad range of critical technologies seemed to be inexorably passing from American to 
Japanese firms.3   
 This situation changed quite dramatically over the course of the 1990s.  R&D 
spending by the private sector in Japan has stagnated during the course of the Heisei 
recession.  Measures of R&D output growth in Japan have declined relative to the United 
States and relative to recent Japanese historical trends.  There is also a widespread sense 
among Japanese R&D managers, industry observers, and government officials that the 
Japanese approach to technological innovation is no longer working effectively, and 
fundamental reform of the national innovation system must take place.4   
 The implications of this apparent decline in Japanese innovative capacity are quite 
serious for Japan’s long-run economic prospects.  The Heisei recession has not been 
driven primarily by technological factors.  Rather, the collapse of asset prices, the 
                                                 
2   See Saxonhouse and Okimoto (1987), Arison et. al. (1992), and Mansfield (1988).  See also the book length 
treatment of Goto (1993). 
3   A study by the respected National Academy of Engineering (1987) concluded that Japan was superior to the United 
States in twenty-five out of thirty-four “critical” technologies.   
4   The Nihon Keizai Shimbun published an editorial in September 2000, entitled “Raising the Productivity of R&D,” 
which summarized many of the perceived shortcomings of the Japanese innovation system. 
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resulting crisis in the banking system, and the inappropriate macroeconomic policy 
responses of the Japanese government over the last ten years have arguably been the 
primary cause.5  However, when normal economic growth resumes in Japan, the 
maximum rate at which that growth can be sustained will be depend in part on the ability 
of Japanese firms to develop and deploy new technology.  If Japan’s innovative capacity 
is growing at a slower rate than in past decades then this could limit Japan’s future 
prospects. 
 This paper examines Japan’s recent R&D performance using several 
complementary modes of analysis.  First, we examine evidence from aggregate economic 
statistics concerning changes in Japanese R&D.  Second, we analyze comprehensive data 
on R&D inputs and outputs for a panel of nearly 200 Japanese firms.  Microeconometric 
analysis of this data set allows us to examine where any downturn in R&D activity is 
concentrated, what Japanese firms are themselves doing to rectify the downturn in 
performance, and what effects these steps have had to date.  Third, we interview several 
corporate R&D managers at leading Japanese firms – both managers in the central R&D 
operation in Japan and managers based at Japanese R&D facilities abroad – concerning 
their perceptions of changes in Japanese innovative capacity and the reasons for these 
changes.    
The main empirical contribution of this paper is to document, at the “micro” level 
and the aggregate level, a slowdown in Japanese relative innovative performance.  We 
find that after a decade of convergence with the U.S. in terms of R&D inputs and outputs 
in the 1980s, Japanese and U.S. innovation trends have diverged sharply in the 1990s.  
Measured in a common currency, real R&D outlays in Japan have grown much more 
                                                 
5   For recent research which supports this view see Posen (1998). 
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slowly than in the U.S.  The gap in patent output that was closing rapidly in the 1980s 
began expanding again in the 1990s.  Turning to our firm-level data, we find evidence of 
a slowdown in the growth of R&D productivity in Japan in the 1990s.  This slowdown 
does not affect all firms equally, however.  By and large, the research productivity of the 
electronics industry, broadly defined, has continued to grow in line with the trends of the 
1980s and early 1990s.  On the other hand, firms outside the electronics industry have 
performed less well.   
Why has Japanese R&D productivity grown more slowly in the 1990s?  A full-
fledged investigation of this important question is beyond the scope of this paper.   
However, drawing upon our interviews with Japanese R&D managers and evidence from 
other economic studies, we are able to present some possible explanations for this 
striking change.  As they have reached the technology frontier, Japanese firms have had 
to re-orient their R&D efforts from the application and refinement of existing, relatively 
well-developed technology to the creation of more fundamental breakthroughs.  The 
shortage of Ph.D.- level engineers and the relative weakness of Japanese academic science 
have inhibited the effectiveness of this more technologically ambitious R&D in Japan.  
Furthermore, attempts to create large, centralized corporate labs focused on more basic 
R&D have run into the same problems that large-scale U.S. corporate R&D labs were 
criticized for in the 1980s, including a lack of focus on the needs of a rapidly evolving 
marketplace.  Finally, the absence of a venture capital industry and the institutions that 
support start-ups in the U.S. made it more difficult to for established Japanese firms to 
“partner” in product development with more entrepreneurial and efficient smaller firms. 
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Having noted these problems, Japanese R&D managers are trying to respond to 
them.  Conversations with Japanese R&D managers revealed several steps Japanese firms 
are taking to restructure their R&D operations and improve research productivity.  This 
draft presents evidence on the impact of two such steps – the establishment of research 
facilities abroad and the forging of technology alliances with U.S. firms.  We find that 
both strategies lead to increased flows of technological information to Japanese firms.  
We also present evidence consistent with the view that these increased flows of 
knowledge raise overall inventive productivity. 
II.  Japan’s R&D Performance in Comparative Perspective 
 After nearly a decade of stagnation in Japan, it is sometimes difficult to recall the 
unease – even fear – that Japan’s seemingly unstoppable economic advance over the 
course of the 1980s once generated among American industrialists and policymakers.  To 
set the stage for our own analysis, it may be worthwhile to review some of the evidence 
on Japan’s expanding technological capability that was generated by the debate over U.S. 
“competitiveness” and the Japanese “threat.” 
 As the Japanese economy expanded, R&D spending steadily increased.  
Moreover, the effectiveness with which Japanese firms applied this R&D expenditure to 
successful generations of useful inventions also seemed to be increasing.  Researchers 
noted that Japanese firms produced more patent applications per R&D dollar than U.S. 
firms, and that this ratio was not declining, as it seemed to be in the rest of the 
industrialized world.6  Scholars familiar with the idiosyncratic features of the Japanese 
patent system prior to its substantial reform in 1988 were quick to point out that many 
more patent applications were required to protect the same amount of intellectual 
                                                 
6   See Okimoto and Saxonhouse (1987) for a discussion of these issues. 
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property in Japan, and that straightforward comparisons of Japanese and U.S. patent 
counts were likely to exaggerate Japan’s technological prowess.7 
 However, because of the importance of the U.S. market, Japanese firms were also 
quite aggressive about patenting their inventions in the U.S. as well as in Japan.  Over the 
course of the late 1970s and 1980s, Japanese firms rapidly increased their level of U.S. 
patenting in absolute numbers and relative to their American counterparts.  Given that the 
two sets of firms were competing under the same patent system with the same set of rules 
and examiners, this seemed to buttress the case that the Japanese were closing the 
technological gap with their U.S. rivals. 
 In addition to these aggregate statistics, careful “micro” studies of Japanese 
innovation, such as Mansfield (1988), also seemed to suggest that Japan’s R&D capacity 
was formidable, particularly Japanese applied R&D capacity. 8  Furthermore, the 
comparative analysis of product development in the automobile industry in Japan, 
Europe, and the United States by Clark and Fujimoto carefully documented Japanese 
firms’ enormous lead over rivals in terms of the resource cost of product development.9 
 However, the picture of expanding relative Japanese technological capability 
changed substantially in the 1990s.  The slow growth of the Japanese economy in that 
decade was quickly reflected in the aggregate statistics on R&D spending.  As shown in 
Figure 1, real Japanese private sector R&D spending leveled off in the 1990s, declining 
slightly in the early 1990s before modestly increasing in the late 1990s.10  In striking 
                                                 
7   Again, Okimoto and Saxonhouse (1987) contains a useful discussion of these points. 
8   Mansfield’s (1988) statistical results suggested that applied R&D expenditure in Japan had a much 
stronger impact on firm-level TFP growth than it did in the United States. 
9   For a useful summary of some of the primary results of this research project, see Clark, Fujimoto, and 
Chew (1987). 
10   Posen (2001), arguing that Japanese innovative capacity has been unaffected by the 1990s recession, 
stresses that the ratio of R&D expenditure to GNP has remained high in Japan – in fact, it is higher than in 
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contrast, U.S. private sector R&D spending grew quite rapidly in real terms in the 1990s, 
reflecting robust macroeconomic growth and the especially rapid growth of high-
technology industries.  This difference in the trends in R&D inputs was also reflected in 
the aggregate statistics on R&D outputs.  For instance, the counts of patents taken out by 
Japanese firms in the United States grew much more slowly after 1990 than they had in 
the 1980s, whereas the reverse was true for the United States.  Figure 2 illustrates this 
divergence, aggregating across all U.S. patent classes.  Throughout the 1980s, one sees 
rapid growth in U.S. patenting by Japanese firms relative to U.S. inventors.  After 1990, 
the gap between U.S. patent grants to Japanese and American inventors begins growing 
again. 
Figure 3 illustrates a similar pattern of convergence followed by divergence 
within the cluster of patent classes that are most closely connected to computers and 
information technologies – what we might refer to as “IT patents.”  As this figure clearly 
shows, by the end of the 1980s, Japanese firms had reached a level of patenting in the 
United States in these patent classes that nearly equaled that of their U.S. counterparts.11  
Over the next 10 years, however, American firms’ patenting in these fields exploded, 
dramatically outstripping the growth in Japanese patents.12   
Finally, it is important to point out that the decline in patents is not merely seen in 
the U.S. patent system, which, important though it is, is only one part of the global 
intellectual property protection system.  Figure 4 illustrates recent trends in worldwide 
                                                                                                                                                 
the United States.  Unfortunately, this reflects the fact that the Japanese economy has scarcely grown over 
the 1990s. 
11   Posen (2001) stresses that many of the top 10 patenting firms in the United States are Japanese 
multinationals.  Unfortunately, the strong performance of these elite firms is not necessarily representative 
of the innovative performance of their industries.   
12  Figures 2 and 3 show a dramatic jump in patenting in 1997.  This relates to a change in U.S. patent law 
which brought the U.S. into compliance with the international standard in patent length.  The law included 
a clause which allowed patents filed before a certain date to receive certain procedural advantages.   
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patent applications by applicants based in the U.S., Japan, and Europe.  Obviously, there 
have been striking increases in the quantity of applications from inventors based in the 
U.S. and Europe, but not in Japan. 
This review of the aggregate evidence suggests that there is something real behind 
the steadily more insistent concerns being raised in Japan about the Japanese national 
innovation system and its comparative performance.13  However, this quick review of the 
aggregate statistics raises an important question.  Is the relative decline in Japanese 
innovative output simply a function of relative declines in R&D spending, or has there 
been a slowdown in the growth of Japanese firms’ innovative capacity, even after 
controlling for changes in R&D spending?  This question is addressed in the next 
sections. 
III. Japanese Private Sector R&D Productivity:  A Micro Analysis 
 In this section, we utilize data collected on R&D inputs and outputs at the level of 
the firm to estimate a simple “knowledge production function.”14  Let innovation for the 
ith firm be a function of its R&D input, such that  
ititit RN F=












        (2) 
                                                 
13   For a forceful presentation of the view that Japan’s relative innovative performance has not changed 
since the 1980s, see Posen (2001).  While we strongly agree with Posen’s main point – that Japan’s poor 
macroeconomic performance in the 1990s has little direct connection with the efficiency of its R&D 
activity – we believe his rather optimistic view of the Japanese innovation system is not consistent with 
some of the evidence presented in this paper. 
14  We note that the empirical methodology in this section borrows heavily from Branstetter (2001), and the 
exposition of this section follows that earlier paper quite closely. 
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Here the d ’s can be thought of as exogenous differences in the “technological 
opportunity” across c different technological fields that are stable across time.  The g ’s 
can be thought of as changes in the overall effectiveness of the R&D process, common to 
all fields, over time.  These latter coefficients will be crucial to our analysis.  We want to 
observe whether, conditional on R&D spending, the overall effectiveness of private 
sector innovative activity is increasing, decreasing, or unchanging over time.  Our 
inference concerning this will be based on the pattern revealed by the g  coefficients.   





ttitit DTrn edgb +++= åå                (3) 
In (3), nit  is innovation, rit is the firm's own R&D investment, the D’s are dummy 
variables to control for differences in the propensity to generate new knowledge across 
technological fields (indicated by the subscript c) , the T’s are year dummies, and e  is an 
error term.   
 Now we come to a pivotal question:  how do we measure innovation?  In fact, 
there are no direct measures of innovation, so tracking "innovation" will require the use 
of indirect and noisy empirical proxies.  If some fraction of new knowledge is patented, 
such that the number of new patents generated by the ith firm is an exponential function 
of its new knowledge,  






x          (4) 
then the production of new knowledge can be proxied by examining the generation of 





ttitit DTrp mdgb                    (5) 
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where pit  is the log of the number of new patents and the other variables are as before, 
except for the error term which is defined below.  Note that we can also allow for firm 
fixed effects, such that there can be time-invariant differences in the propensity to patent 
among firms within industries.  Because firms in our sample do not change their primary 
industry affiliation over time, the industry effect will “fall out” with the firm fixed effect.   
 As written, equation (5) suggests that the log of patent counts should be our 
dependent variable.  Because some firms in our sample are observed to take out zero 
patents in a given year, this creates an obvious problem – one cannot take the log of zero.  
In the earlier micro “R&D/Patents” literature, it was customary to take the log of the 
count of patents plus 1, in order to get around this problem.  However, this somewhat 
arbitrary transformation of the dependent variable could bias the results.   
 Rather than adopt this questionable approach, we have used count data statistical 
models to conduct our analysis.  In particular, we use the fixed effects negative binomial 
estimator developed by Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984), to estimate a version of (5) 
in which a 0 realization of the dependent variable does not pose any kind of mathematical 
problem. 15 
 To implement this approach, we collected data on the patents granted to Japanese 
firms in the United States (dated by year of patent application), patents applied for by 
Japanese firms in Japan, R&D spending, and industry affiliation.  Data on U.S. patents 
come from the NBER patent database.  Data on Japanese firm R&D spending come 
primarily from the annual R&D surveys published by Toyo Keizai in the Japan Company 
                                                 
15   A sketch derivation of this estimator is provided in a longer version of this paper, available from the 
authors upon request.  For a more complete development, see Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984). 
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Handbook.  Data on Japanese firms’ patent applications in Japan come from the 
PATOLIS database.16 
 An immediate question arises as to the representativeness of our sample.  In 
Japan, R&D spending and patenting have historically been highly concentrated in the 
larger industrial firms, and this pattern has not changed over the past decade.  A balanced 
panel of large industrial firms in the U.S. would become steadily less representative of 
U.S. patenting over the 1990s because of the rising role of universities and high- tech 
start-up firms in U.S. inventive activity.  In Japan, there is no evidence of a similar shift.  
Our sample includes most of the leading innovative firms in Japan. 17 
 For our purposes, the use of U.S. patents is actually the preferred metric of 
innovative output.  A major patent reform in Japan in 1988 allowed Japanese firms to 
change the number of claims per patent, making it at least theoretically possible for 
Japanese firms to protect the same amount of intellectual property with a smaller number 
of patents.  It is thus difficult to draw long-term inference about changes in research 
productivity using Japanese patent application counts because the relationship between 
innovations and patents has shifted over time.18  There was no such change in the U.S. 
patent system over our sample period.  Furthermore, we know that Japanese firms tended 
to submit patent applications to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office for the ideas which 
they perceived, at least ex ante, to have the most promise, so that a U.S. patent count 
series represents a “quality-adjusted” measure of innovative output.  Finally, thanks to the 
availability of U.S. patent data in electronic form, it is possible to conduct an additional 
                                                 
16   Further information on data sources and construction is provided in the attached Data Appendix.  
17   A complete list of the firms in the sample is available from the authors upon request. 




“quality adjustment” by measuring the number of citations received by a patent from 
subsequently granted patents over some fixed time period – in our case, four years.  
 The first column of Table 1 presents results of a fixed effects negative binomial 
regression of U.S. patent counts on firm R&D spending and our year dummy variables.  
Controlling for R&D spending at the firm level, the coefficients on the time dummies 
trace out changes in the level of R&D output that are common to all firms.  In other 
words, it gives us a sense of how innovative output is changing, on average, after we 
have controlled for inputs.  Figure 5 graphs the pattern traced out by the time dummies, 
along with the 95% confidence bounds.  The picture that emerges is fairly striking.  From 
the mid-to- late 1980s, one sees a sharp increase in average innovative output.  This 
growth largely ceases in the early 90s, suggesting that R&D productivity reached a 
plateau around 1990 and grew little thereafter.19 
 Is this cessation of R&D productivity growth real or an artifact of the data? The 
substitution of observable patents for unobservable innovation creates some problems for 
our statistical inference.  The g  coefficients measure not just changes in the productivity 
of R&D activity over time, but also changes in the propensity to patent in the United 
States over time.  It could be, for instance, that Japanese firms are generating larger 
numbers of innovations over time, but that, in order to economize on the costs of 
protecting their intellectual property rights, they are being more selective about which 
patents they take out in the U.S.  In other words, a count-based output measure would 
show a flattening of innovative productivity, where there was none.20 
                                                 
19   Including deflated sales as an additional regressor yields results qualitatively similar to those presented 
here. 
20   We thank Hiroyuki Odagiri for stressing this point. 
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 To try to get around this possibility, we constructed a measure of patent output in 
which we adjusted for the number of citations received by each patent up to four years 
after it was granted.  If the number of patents taken out in the U.S. is going down because 
only the upper tail of the quality distribution of innovations is actually being patented, 
then an outcomes measure that controls for innovation quality would be less likely to 
generate a spurious result of flat productivity growth. 
 The second column of Table 1 presents results from such a regression.  Figure 6 
graphs the coefficients along with their 95% confidence bounds.  The picture that 
emerges is remarkably similar to that in Figure 5.  Note that, in the last years of our 
sample, measured productivity declines sharply.  This is an artifact of our data.  Detailed 
studies of patent citations show that it takes several years for patent citations to a 
particular invention to peak.  A patent applied for in 1996 would not be granted, on 
average, until 1997 or 1998 – possibly even later.  Thus, we would only pick up less than 
four years’ worth of patent citations.  For this reason, coefficients on year dummies for 
years later than 1995 in this graph should be viewed with caution.  
 The next set of regression results segmented our sample into industry groups, to 
see how research productivity trends differed among industries.21  Figure 7 displays some 
results from these regressions.  The top line traces out measured increases in research 
productivity for electronics firms.  The bottom line traces out the measured path for non-
electronics firms.  These results indicate that the research productivity of the electronics 
industry, broadly defined, has continued to grow through the 1990s more or less in line 
with the trends of the 1980s.  However, the results suggest a decline in research 
productivity for manufacturing firms outside the electronics industry.  That is, controlling 
                                                 
21   A table reporting all of the coefficients from this regression is available from the authors upon request. 
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for innovative inputs, these firms are generating less innovative output, on average, then 
they were in the late 1980s.  Regression results based on citation-adjusted patent output 
measures indicate a similar pattern.   
 Table 2 presents results based on Japanese patent applications.  If one pools data 
across all firms, the Japanese patent application data suggest a continuing rise in 
innovative productivity through the mid 1990s, but a slowdown in that growth relative to 
the trends of the 1980s.  Splitting the sample along industry lines indicates electronics 
firms have outperformed firms in other industries.  In both cases, a slowdown in 
productivity growth is evident, occurring sooner among the firms outside of electronics.  
While there were substantial increases in R&D productivity in the early 1990s for 
electronics firms, the increase is much less impressive outside that sector.22  A similar 
breakdown of R&D productivity trends by size category suggests that, outside the 
electronics sector, relatively smaller firms are more likely to show progress in research 
productivity than the larger firms.  This finding was confirmed using U.S. patent output 
data as well.23 
 What can we conclude from our preliminary exploration of the firm-level data?  
Our results suggest that changes in Japan’s absolute and relative performance are not 
simply or solely the result of a decline in firms’ R&D spending.  Although we find some 
evidence of an actual decline in research productivity in some sectors, the more robust 
result is that the broad-based increase in Japanese research productivity that was so 
                                                 
22   One could make the argument that the evidence from Japanese patent applications could be consistent 
with increased innovation in both categories if the number of claims was rising fast enough to offset the 
slowdown in the growth of patent applications.  This possibility indicates the need for caution in 
interpreting results based on Japanese patent data.  For a study of Japanese innovation trends in the 
immediate aftermath of the 1988 patent reform, see Sakakibara and Branstetter (2001). 
23  These regression results are available from the authors upon request. 
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striking in the 1980s has largely faded in the 1990s.  The exception to this general trend is 
the electronics sector, which has continued to increase its innovative output, controlling 
for input, more or less in line with earlier trends.  However, the continued progress in 
R&D productivity in this sector has not prevented Japanese firms from falling well 
behind their American rivals in such key patent categories as IT.  This may reflect 
Japanese firms’ inability to match their rivals’ expanding investments in R&D.   
IV. Why has research productivity growth slowed and what should be done?  A 
Managerial Perspective 
 
 At this point, we relate some of the results of our interviews with Japanese R&D 
managers, conducted in the U.S. and Japan in 2000 and 2001.  These were fascinating 
exchanges, and we regret that the space constraints for this paper and the confidential 
nature of some of the material restrict what we can pass on to the reader.  Each 
interviewed company had made, over the last two decades, a substantial commitment to 
R&D at the technological frontier within its industry.  A large central R&D operation had 
been built up with the aim of creating important technical breakthroughs that could be 
incorporated into future generations of products.  While our interviewees tended to be 
corporations recognized as technological leaders within their fields, this change in focus 
from applied to more basic R&D is broadly reflected in larger, more representative 
surveys.24  A change in the focus of R&D was inevitable – at one time, Japanese firms 
were the global low-cost suppliers of standardized products, but manufacturers in South 
                                                 
24   The stereotype of Japanese firms as being effective imitators and implementers rather than innovators 
may have been an accurate description of Japanese R&D activity in the late 1970s or early 1980s, but by 
the late 1980s, Japanese firms had reached the technological frontier and their continued success 
increasingly depended on their ability to advance that frontier.   See Goto and Nagata (1995) and the 
statistics presented in Gijutsu Yoran (2000 edition) for evidence that the distribution of R&D effort across 





Korea, Taiwan, and China are increasingly able to undercut Japanese firms.  This means 
that Japanese firms have to compete on the basis of innovative products.  
 Despite this investment in frontier research, the interviewed R&D managers are 
universally dissatisfied with the results.  The view within firms seems to be that the 
central R&D laboratories have become bureaucratic, insular, and unresponsive to the 
needs of the firm.  R&D management has been unable to effectively transla te the basic 
and frontier research conducted by the central R&D laboratories into effective new 
products.  To a surprising extent, the critiques of the central R&D operations seem to 
echo criticism made in the 1980s by American firms of their own central R&D 
operations, which were also maligned as being unable to translate research advances 
effectively into new products.  In other words, managerial perception confirms the 
findings of our statistical analysis – managers think their relative R&D performance has 
declined. 
 Our interviewees spoke admiringly of the way their American counterparts had 
restructured their R&D operations over the last decade, and most of the interviewed firms 
were also trying to restructure their own R&D operations along the lines of the “new” 
U.S. model.  While the characteristics of the new structure of R&D are still emerging, 
conversations with Japanese corporate R&D managers suggest that these features 
include:  1) greater reliance on R&D partnerships outside the traditional vertical keiretsu 
networks within Japan, 2) greater reliance on foreign (especially U.S.) R&D partnerships 
and acquisitions of high-tech firms, 3) greater emphasis on cooperation with universities, 
at home and abroad, 4) a de-emphasis on centralized "in-house" R&D and a gradual 
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downsizing of resources invested in central R&D facilities, and 5) increased interest and 
investment in “corporate venturing” programs.   
If there is a single theme that guides all of these departures from the “traditional” 
model of research, it might be a move from a focus on in-house research and 
development toward a focus on increased “R&D outsourcing.”  Essentially, the expensive 
experiment with trying to create technical breakthroughs inside Japanese corporate 
laboratories has had only limited success.  So, Japanese firms, in conscious imitation of 
their U.S. counterparts, are placing increased emphasis on sourcing useful technologies 
from outside the firm, which can then be combined with the firm’s own technical 
strengths to generate important new products.25  Because Japan still has, despite extensive 
efforts by the government to promote them, relatively few high-tech start-ups, and 
because the quality and level of academic research in Japan typically lags that of the U.S., 
Japanese firms have moved aggressively to expand their efforts to “tap into” U.S. 
technology networks.   
 However, both prior research and comments from our interviewees suggest that 
Japanese firms may have faced special challenges as they moved from a focus on applied 
R&D and development toward a concentration on research at the technology frontier.  
First, as Gary Saxonhouse has pointed out for decades, the Japanese higher education 
system produces far fewer Ph.D.s in the sciences and engineering than does the U.S. 
educational system. 26  This is true not only in terms of absolute numbers but also in per 
capita terms.  While Japan has produced many more engineering graduates at the 
                                                 
25   One interviewee cited statistics indicating that such leading U.S. technology firms as IBM, Microsoft, 
and Cisco were spending large sums of money (equivalent to substantial fractions of their corporate R&D 
budgets) on ideas generated outside the firm. 
26   Again, see Okimoto and Saxonhouse (1987). 
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bachelors degree level per capita, and this may have been sufficient to propel Japan’s 
technical advance while it was still behind the technology frontier, it is reasonable to 
think that, as Japanese firms have reached the frontier, it has become more important to 
have technical personnel with highly specialized training.  These individuals are far less 
numerous in Japan than in the United States.  In some fields, such as software 
engineering, the shortage of engineers with advanced degrees is so acute that there have 
been references to the “soft crisis” for fifteen years.27  Even in the U.S., demand for 
software engineers dramatically outstripped supply in the 1990s – but U.S. immigration 
law allowed the “import” of hundreds of thousands of foreign engineers to bridge the 
gap.28   
 Second, U.S. high technology firms are able to work with and build upon the 
research of the world’s most celebrated research universities and institutions.  Despite 
important advances over the postwar period, the quantity and quality of publicly funded 
research in Japanese universities and research institutes typically lags behind that 
conducted in the U.S.  While the results of this kind of “public science” are generally 
published in easily accessible scientific journals, understanding and applying the most 
recent scientific developments may require a degree of familiarity with and connection to 
that recent science that is harder to come by in Japan than in the United States.  
As Figures 3-6 made clear, there has been a surge of patenting and a sharp 
increase in R&D spending in the U.S. over the course of the 1990s.  While there is not 
yet a consensus regarding the causes of this increase, recent research suggests several 
potentially important factors.  Some component of the increase has probably been driven 
                                                 
27   See Finan and Williams (1992). 
28   We thank Amar Bhide and Ashish Aurora for discussions on the role of immigration (especially from 
India) in propelling the U.S. high-tech boom of the 1990s.   
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by changes in “scientific and technological opportunity.”  Important fundamental 
scientific breakthroughs in molecular biology, genetics, and, more recently, genomics, 
have helped fuel a sharp increase in the number of patents granted in fields associated 
with “biotechnology.”  Likewise, recent advances in telecommunications and computer 
networking have probably helped drive a sharp increase in patenting in the “IT” classes.29 
Consistent with this “science-driven” view of increased innovation, corporate patents are 
increasingly citing scientific papers, suggesting that the link between science and 
innovation is tighter than in the past.30  It is uncertain whether these breakthroughs will 
continue to generate opportunities for industrial application, or whether they will 
eventually “play themselves out” as the opportunities for commercial application of these 
new discoveries are exhausted.     
Kortum and Lerner (1998) point out that the increase in patenting is not confined 
to those clusters of technologies that have seen recent fundamental breakthroughs.  
Instead, they argue that the management of R&D has undergone an institutional change – 
they argue that a system of small start-up firms financed by venture capital partnerships is 
more productive than the traditional “big corporate R&D system,” and they present 
evidence that the increase in innovation has been highest where venture capital 
investment is most concentrated.  The recent collapse of the IT sector and the large-scale 
bankruptcies of venture-backed high tech firms over the last two years suggest that the 
ultimate power of this institutional innovation to propel increased innovation in the long 
run may have been overstated, but it is almost certain to have played an important role in 
the late 1990s. 
                                                 
29   See Cockburn and Henderson (2000) and Hicks et. al. (2001) for recent studies touching on these issues. 
30   For studies of this expanding linkage, see Narin et. al. (1997) and Branstetter (2001). 
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Of course, a more cynical review of the recent surge in innovation would regard it 
as more of a mirage than a reality – a mirror image of the surge in physical capital 
investment during Japan’s “bubble economy.”  Due to increases in the breadth and length 
of intellectual property protection afforded by patents – and in an effort to ward off patent 
lawsuits – firms have simply sharply increased their propensity to patent.  Perhaps the 
most disturbing study along these lines is the work of Hall and Ziedonis (2001), who 
show that there has been a sharp increase in the propensity to patent in the semiconductor 
industry for reasons that have little to do with a real increase in innovation.  We do not 
hold the view that the recent surge in U.S. innovation is entirely a mirage, but, clearly, 
Japanese firms should exercise caution in borrowing from the “new U.S. model,” when it 
is still unclear what features of this model have really played a significant role.   
 While we eventually hope to explore all of the dimensions of the Japanese 
industrial R&D restructuring outlined in the paragraphs above as part of a long-term 
research project, in this draft we focus on the international dimension of Japanese firms’ 
R&D restructuring.  In doing so, we seek to answer two questions.  First, how and to 
what extent are Japanese firms seeking to obtain useful technological information from 
U.S. sources?  Second, is this strategy working?  In other words, have Japanese firms that 
have made the effort to tap into U.S. technology networks benefited, in terms of raising 
their R&D productivity?  Drawing upon recent research by one of the authors, we seek to 
shed light on these questions in the next section. 
V.   Tapping into U.S. technology networks:  Has it worked? 
 As much prior research has documented, Japanese firms have historically been 
enthusiastic licensees of U.S. technology.  However, the concept of “tapping into” U.S. 
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technology networks that we attempt to measure in this section is not a passive 
implementation of technology developed by another firm, but rather, the incorporation of 
ideas developed outside the firm into the firm’s own R&D operation.  It is much more 
pro-active than simple licensing, and there seem to be two primary modes by which it 
takes place. 
Establishment of research facilities abroad.  Japanese investment abroad is 
tracked by both public and private databases.  Using the Kaigai Kigyou Shihon 
Shinshutsu database, one can track Japanese investment in foreign R&D/product 
development facilities and acquisitions of U.S. firms at the level of the Japanese parent 
firm.  Prior research on the overseas R&D of Japanese firms has emphasized that the 
fraction of the firms’ total R&D effort expended by these overseas research facilities has 
been relatively modest.  They collectively account for only a tiny fraction of overall firm 
R&D spending and overall firm patenting. 31  However, they may play an important role 
as a “bridge” between in-house R&D resources and useful U.S. technology, despite their 
relatively small size.  Drawing upon results from Branstetter (2001), we will present 
evidence on this issue. 
Research alliances.  Japanese firms have also been aggressive about forming 
technology-sharing and technology-development alliances with U.S. firms.  Two data 
sources track these alliances over time, identifying the Japanese and U.S. partners.  The 
SDC alliance database uses contemporary press accounts to track corporate alliances, of 
which the “technology” alliances that are the focus of this section are a subset.  
Unfortunately, the extent of coverage of this database tends to be rather thin prior to the 
early 1990s.  A more comprehensive database, focusing specifically in technology 
                                                 
31  Evidence on these points is provided by Odagiri and Yasuda (1997) and by Belderbos (1999). 
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alliances, has been assembled over the years by a team of researchers at the University of 
Maastricht.  This “CATI” database, developed under the supervision of John Hagedoorn, 
is arguably the most comprehensive and detailed database available.  While the results in 
this draft are based on the SDC database results, the final draft will incorporate data from 
the CATI database. 
Do alliances and U.S. R&D facilities promote flows of knowledge from U.S. to 
Japanese firms?  We assess this using data on the citations to prior American inventions 
found in the U.S. patents of Japanese firms.  We are careful to exclude all Japanese-
invented U.S. patents from this set of “American” inventions.  Using an empirical 
methodology developed in Branstetter (2001), we presume that the flow of patent 
citations is proportional to the flow of knowledge.32 
Let CJit be the number of citations made by the patent applications Japanese firm i 
filed in year t to the cumulated stock of “indigenous” U.S.-invented patents granted as of 




AtJitJit ReeeNNCE iitit aa
bbbbbb 654321 ]][][[)()(][ =    (6) 
 Let E be the expectations operator.  Here E[CJit] is a function of the number of 
patents Japanese firm i has taken out in the U.S. in year t (NJit), the number of potentially 
cited indigenous U.S. patents which exist as of year t (NAt), the level of firm i’s “FDI 
presence” in the U.S. in year t (FDIit), the level of firm i’s alliance activity with U.S. 
firms in year t, and the extent to which firm i is at a point in the technology space which 
                                                 
32   This framework builds heavily on the methodology of Jaffe and Trajtenberg (1996) and the citations 
data are taken from Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg (2001). 
33  Note that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office only makes available data on patent applications that are 
eventually granted.  In this paper, patents are dated by year of application rather than year of grant, because 
it takes on average two years – sometimes much longer – for the patent office to grant a patent. 
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is “densely populated” by other indigenous U.S. patents (PROXi).  Some Japanese firms 
might cite U.S. patents more frequently simply because they happen to be working on 
technologies in which a large number of indigenous U.S. inventors are active.   
 If one wishes to control for this “technological proximity,” the existing literature 
suggests a way in which it could be done.  The typical Japanese firm in this data set 
conducts R&D in a number of technological fields simultaneously.  One could obtain a 
measure of a firm's location in "technology space" by measuring the distribution of its 
R&D effort across various technological fields.  Let firm i’s R&D program be described 
by the vector F, where  
),...,( 1 ki ffF =                 (7) 
and each of the k elements of F represent the firm's research resources and expertise in 
the kth technological area.34  From the number of patents taken out in different 
technological areas, we can infer what the distribution of R&D investment and 
technological expertise across different technical fields has been.    
 In the same way, we can also compute a vector of location in technology space for 
the aggregate of all U.S. inventors, treating them as though they belonged to a single 









PROX        (8) 
This is a technological proximity coefficient in the spirit of Jaffe (1986).  
                                                 
34  The k  different technological clusters are constructed by aggregating the hundreds of patent classes in 
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office classification system into 50 distinct categories of technology.  I then 




One may also wish to allow citations to be influenced by the firms’ R&D 
spending (Rit) and by vectors of multiplicative “fixed effects” associated with the citing 
firm ( ia ) and the (application) year in which the citation takes place ( ta ).  Including 
these fixed effects actually simplifies the equation, provided one is willing to make some 
assumptions.  The stock of cumulated potentially citable “indigenous” U.S. patents will 
be the same for all Japanese citing firms in each year, so that the NAt  terms are effectively 
absorbed into the time dummies.  One may also want to assume that a firm’s location in 
technology space relative to aggregate American inventive activity is relatively fixed 
over time.  In that case, the effect of the PROX measure is absorbed into the firm fixed 
effects.35  The fact that I cannot separately identify it from the firm effects is of little 
concern, as my primary focus is on the impact of changes in FDI on citations. 
 Taking the log of (6) and implementing these assumptions gives us a simple, log-
linear estimation equation 
iti
t
ttititititJit TAlliancerFDIpc eaabbbbb +++++++= å43210    (9) 
where cJit is the log of the number of citations made by the U.S. patent applications of 
Japanese firm i in year t to indigenous U.S. patents, p is the log of the count of U.S. 
patent applications of Japanese firm i in year t, FDI is one of a number of alternative 
measures of the FDI stock of firm i in year t, r is the log of R&D spending of firm i in 
year t, Alliance measures alliance activity, the ta ’s are time dummies, and ia  is a “firm 
effect,” reflecting firm-specific research productivity and, perhaps, firm-specific but time 
                                                 
35  “Industry effects” will also be absorbed into the firm effects, because firms in my sample do not change 
their primary industry affiliation over time. 
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invariant differences in the “connectedness” of the Japanese firm’s research team to 
current developments in U.S. research that might affect its tendency to cite U.S. patents. 
 The assumption that the technological proximity of a Japanese firm to U.S. 
inventive activity stays fixed over a long period is a strong one.  The data permit us to 
allow this proximity measure to vary within firms over time, although we lack 
sufficiently rich patent data to do this for all firms or all years.  If firms are 
simultaneously increasing their FDI in the U.S. and moving “closer” to U.S. firms in 
technology space, this new specification allows us to control for the latter effect, picking 
up only the partial effect of an increase in FDI or alliance activity on “spillovers” as 
measured by citations.36  This imposes a much more stringent statistical test of the impact 
of FDI (or the impact of alliance activity) on knowledge spillovers.  After all, it is 
possible some of the movement of Japanese firms in “technology space” is induced by 
spillovers from American firms, which they receive either through their network of 
subsidiaries or their network of alliances.  However, if a positive effect of FDI and/or 
alliance activity remains even after controlling for this movement, this is even stronger 
evidence in favor of the view that FDI and/or alliances function as a channel of 
knowledge spillovers.  The specification suggested by this line of thinking would be: 
iti
t
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36  Suppose Fujitsu decides to become a world leader in “wireless modems.”  Fujitsu will need to establish 
distribution and, possibly, manufacturing facilities in America because it is a leading national market for 
this kind of product.  At the same time, Fujitsu will begin to conduct more research on technologies related 
to wireless modems and take out more patents protecting its research in this area.  Since many American 
firms have been active in this technology, Fujitsu’s new patents will inevitably cite American patents quite 
frequently.  In this case, a change in firm strategy generates both an increase in U.S. FDI and an increase in 
citations to U.S. patents, though there is no direct causal relationship between the two variables.  Without 




 The focus of interest will be on the coefficients 2b  and 4b .  Do firms that 
increase their levels of FDI in the United States experience an increased tendency to cite 
U.S. patents?37  Do firms that engage in more frequent technology alliances and R&D 
joint ventures with U.S. experience an increased tendency to cite U.S. patents?  Positive, 
significant coefficients would suggest the answer is yes in both cases.  The reason why 
one might expect a positive coefficient is straightforward.  To monitor and understand 
other firms’ R&D can be a difficult task – particularly when the other firms’ R&D 
activities are located on the opposite side of the Pacific Ocean.  It may be facilitated 
enormously by the geographical proximity attained through FDI, through which the cost 
of accessing foreign firms’ knowledge assets is reduced.  This effect may occur 
regardless of whether or not the FDI by the Japanese firm takes the form of “greenfield” 
new investment or acquisition of existing U.S. firms.38  Obviously, this monitoring can 
also be facilitated by R&D alliances, and the alliances may foster spillover benefits that 
go beyond the technology targeted by the alliance and even beyond the direct alliance 
partners. 
 Results of an estimation of (10) are given in Table 6.  We see clearly that both 
alliances and R&D subsidiaries have a positive, statistically significant impact on the 
measured flow of technological knowledge from U.S. to Japanese firms.  While the 
coefficients are small in magnitude, the reader should recall that the coefficients give the 
increase in knowledge flows associated with the establishment of an additional subsidiary 
                                                 
37  It may be that an acquisition or greenfield investment might not have an immediate impact on the 
research of the Japanese parent firm, so various lags of the FDI “stock” will be considered. 
38   Because technological knowledge could flow through Japanese subsidiaries, even if they are not 
primarily established for the purpose of tracking U.S. technology trends, Branstetter (2001) examines the 
effect of the total subsidiary network and of acquisitions, as well as the establishment of R&D centers per 
se, on the impact of knowledge flows from U.S. to Japanese firms. 
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or an additional alliance.  Because some firms in our data set went from zero subsidiaries 
(or alliances) to several dozen, the cumulative effect implied by the regression 
coefficients could be quite substantial.   
 Our conversations with Japanese R&D managers suggest an important 
complementarity between overseas R&D facilities and R&D alliances.  Often, overseas 
R&D centers are used as a base from which to search out alliance partners, and, in many 
cases, the site of R&D centers was selected with current or potential alliance partners in 
mind.  In future work, we hope to explore our microdata for evidence of this 
complementarity. 
 Does this strategy work?  The finding that the establishment of overseas R&D 
facilities and research alliances enhance knowledge flows is of limited interest unless it is 
the case that firms which receive greater knowledge flows from the U.S. are able to 
translate that into greater innovative productivity.  Of course, firmly establishing a causal 
linkage between enhanced knowledge flows and greater innovative productivity is 
difficult, but in the Table 7, we present evidence that is at least consistent with this view.  
The first column of the table reports the results of a fixed effects negative binomial 
regression.  In this case, the dependent variable is our citation-adjusted measure of U.S. 
patent output.  We regress this on firm-level R&D spending and two separate measures of 
knowledge flows from the U.S.  The first measure is the count of citations to U.S. patents 
– the dependent variable from our previous set of regression results.  We see clearly that 
U.S. knowledge flows are positively associated with higher quality patent output, and that 
  
29 
this association is robust to the inclusion of a control for patent counts.39  The coefficient 
is very small, but the reader should recall that the statistical interpretation of this 
coefficient is the increase in patent quality associated with an additional citation.  
Because some firms make hundreds of such citations in a single year’s cohort of patent 
applications, the cumulative effects of a substantial increase in such citations could be 
quite substantial.   
 This point is demonstrated by the results in the second column of Table 7.  The 
measure of knowledge flow used in this column is a simple dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the firm in question receives higher than the median level of citations over the sample 
period.  A random effects negative binomial regression shows that this variable is highly 
significant and large in magnitude, suggesting that there is a strong correlation in the 
cross section between high levels of knowledge flow and high levels of quality-adjusted 
patent output.  Frequently-citing firms generate patents that are nearly 90% “better,” as 
measured by their ex-post citations.  We cannot interpret this as strong causal evidence of 
a linkage between knowledge flows from the U.S. and invention quality, because there 
are likely to be important unmeasured differences in the research quality of firms which 
may be correlated with the frequency with which they cite U.S. patents.  Nevertheless, 
these results offer large sample statistical evidence consistent with the view expressed by 
our interviewees that “tapping into U.S. technology networks” can be a useful component 
of an R&D reform strategy. 
VI. Conclusion 
                                                 
39   The obvious relationship between counts of citations to prior U.S. patents and the number of successful 
Japanese patent applications requires the use of this control.  This implies that our innovative output 
measure is, in effect, measuring the average quality of patents in a given cohort. 
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 Less than a decade ago, Japanese firms were held up as exemplars of strength in 
technological innovation.  Today, leaders in government and industry are calling for a 
reform of the national innovation system in order to raise the long-run sustainable growth 
rate of the Japanese economy.  This paper has demonstrated that there are reasonable 
grounds for concern about the relative performance of Japanese manufacturing firms in 
technology- intensive industries.  To answer the question posed by our title, we do not 
find strong evidence that Japanese innovative capacity has actually declined.  However, 
that capacity has failed to grow at the rate of the 1980s.  As a result, U.S. and worldwide 
patent statistics suggest that Japanese firms have fallen behind their American 
counterparts, even in areas where Japanese firms were formerly relatively quite strong 
and rapidly converging on U.S. levels of inventive output.  
 Microeconometric analysis suggests that this decline in relative performance 
cannot be entirely ascribed to a relative reduction in R&D inputs, though such a relative 
reduction has occurred.  We find evidence consistent with the view that, outside the 
electronics sector, R&D productivity growth has stagnated in the 1990s – perhaps even 
declined.  This view is strongly reflected in the U.S. patent data, and the results are robust 
to an adjustment for the quality of individual U.S. patents.  Japanese patent data do not 
provide as strong a confirmation of this view, but the shortcomings of Japanese patent 
applications as consistent measures of inventive output over time have been noted in the 
text. 
 Anecdotal evidence from R&D manager interviews is strongly consistent with a 
slowdown/decline in Japanese R&D productivity relative to the firms’ American 
competitors and relative to their own experience in the 1980s.  Firms are taking steps to 
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increase the efficiency of their R&D operations, and one key strategy adopted to varying 
degrees by all interviewed firms includes an increased emphasis on “tapping into U.S. 
technology networks.”  We provide a microeconometric assessment of the impact of 
steps taken to accomplish these strategic goals, finding that the establishment of R&D 
centers in the U.S. and the formation of technology-sharing alliances with U.S. firms 
have a positive impact on knowledge flow from U.S. to Japanese firms.  Finally, we show 
that increased international knowledge flows are strongly correlated with higher levels of 
innovative performance, at least in the firm cross-section. 
 In future work, we plan to conduct a more comprehensive examination of 
Japanese firm R&D restructuring which considers all aspects of the restructuring process.  
We believe that this more comprehensive study could shed useful light on the extent of 
the restructuring, the degree to which different components have had positive effects on 
research productivity, and the role that public policy could play in enhancing the 
evolution of the Japanese innovation system.  Furthermore, our interviews strongly 
suggested that the move toward partial outsourcing of R&D is not a purely Japanese 
phenomenon, but rather a conscious imitation of a shift that is already well underway in 
the U.S.  A Japanese perspective on the global process of “vertical disintegration of 
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Source:  Gijutsu Yoran, 2000.  Graph shows real R&D expenditures in millions of yen.













































Source:  Authors’ calculations using the NBER Patent Database described in Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2001).



















































Source:  Gijutsu Yoran, 2000.  Graph measures real private sector R&D spending, converted into 
trillions of yen, using the OECD purchasing power parity exchange rates.






























































































































Source:  Gijutsu Yoran, 2000.  This measures patent applications generated by inventors in the 
indicated country and submitted worldwide. 
 
 






















Table 1 Japanese R&D Productivity Trends 
Fixed effects negative binomial regression models 




















































































Trends in Japanese R&D Productivity, 1982-1997
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Trends in Japanese R&D Productivity
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Results after 1995 may reflect the truncation
of our citation measures
 































Divergence in R&D Productivity Growth after 1989
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Table 2 Japanese R&D Productivity Trends 
Fixed effects negative binomial regression models 
using Japanese patent application data 






















































































































R&D Productivity Trends in Electronics and Other Manufacturing Industries
































Table 3 Manfield’s Survey Evidence on the Allocation 
  of Japanese and U.S. R&D Expenditure  
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Source:  Mansfield (1988) 
 
Table 4 Goto and Nagata’s (1995) Evidence on the Allocation 
  of Japanese and U.S. R&D Expenditure  
Variable US Japan 
Percent of R&D budget devoted to 
process innovation 
30.1 14.7 
Percent of R&D budget devoted to 
product innovation 
65.9 80.9 
Effectiveness of patents for 
protecting product innovation 
40.6 39.7 
Fraction of process innovations 
patented 
36.5 29.7 
Fraction of product innovations 
patented 
55.1 60.2 
Source:  Goto and Nagata, 1995 
 
Table 5 Aggregate Evidence on the Allocation of Japanese 
  and U.S. R&D Expenditure from the Management and 
  Coordination Agency 
Country Basic research Applied 
research 
Development 
Japan (1998) 13.9 24.6 61.4 
US 
(1999) 
16.3 22.9 60.9 











Table 6 Measuring Spillovers to Japanese Firms 
Negative Binomial Regressions  













       
log R&D   -.020   .029   -.017 -.020 -.017 -.017 
  (.014)  (.021)  (.014) (.014) (.014) (.014) 
       
log U.S. patents   .846   .510   .840 .847 .840 .840 
  (.016)  (.024)  (.016) (.016) (.016) (.016) 
       
Proximity   .574   1.02  .543 .579 .543 .543 
   (.084)   (.119)  (.085) (.085) (.085) (.085) 
       
U.S. FDI   .005   .034   .017  .0035 .015 
  (.002)  (.025)  (.004)  (.002) (.004) 
       






       
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Log Likelihood -6440.5 -6895.2 -6433.7 -6440.5 -6433.4 -6433.4 
       
       
(1)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of all U.S. subsidiaries. 
(2)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of acquired U.S. subsidiaries.   
(3)  Indicates FDI measured as cumulative counts of U.S. R&D/product development 
facilities. 






Table 7 Do Increased Knowledge Flows Raise Innovative Productivity? 
Negative Binomial Regressions  





   
log R&D   .031   .023 
  (.021)  (.027) 
   
log real sales   .011   .101 
  (.034)  (.036) 
   
log U.S. patents   .956   .822 
   (.016)   (.021) 
   
log citations to U.S.   .0001  
patents  (.00002)  
   
Dummy for citation  
greater than median 
 .899 
(.096) 
   
Time Dummies Yes Yes 
   
Log Likelihood -6119.5 -7884.8 
   









Sketch Derivation of Negative Binomial Regression Models 
 Here, I summarize the results of the derivation of count data estimators by 
Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984).  The notation below borrows extensively from the 
presentation of these basic results found in Montalvo and Yafeh (1994). 
 The Poisson estimator posits a relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables such that  











              
where l bit
Xe it=            (11) 
Econometric estimation is possible by estimating the log likelihood function using 
standard maximum likelihood techniques.  The negative binomial estimator generalizes 
the Poisson by allowing an additional source of variance.  I allow the Poisson parameter 
lambda to be randomly distributed according to a gamma distribution.  Thus defining 
lambda as before 
l ebit
X
ie it= +               (12) 
Using the relationship between the marginal and conditional distributions, I can write 
Pr[ ] Pr[ | ] ( )N n N n f dit it it it it it it= = =ò l l l            (13) 
If the density function is assumed to follow a gamma distribution, then the Poisson model 
becomes a Negative Binomial model: 
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where 
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Integrating by parts and using the fact that  
G G( ) ( ) ( )!a a a a= - = -1 1              (18) 
yields the following distribution 
Pr( )
( )
( ) ( )






















          (19) 
with 
E nit it( ) = a                (20) 
and 
V nit it it it( ) /= +a a f
2              (21) 
This can also be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques.  The log likelihood 
function becomes  




it it it it it it( ) log ( ) log ( ) log ( ) log( ) ( ) log( )b l l l d l d= + - - + + - + +å å G G G 1 1
  (22) 
with 
V n eit
X it( ) ( ) /= +b d d1            (23)  
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Thus, the coefficients are estimated using standard maximum likelihood techniques. 
 In the interests of space, I will not reproduce here the derivation of fixed-effects 
versions of the Poisson and Negative Binomial models.  The reader is referred to 
Hausman, Hall, and Griliches (1984). 
DATA APPENDIX 
 
This data appendix briefly describes our data sources.  A more detailed 
description of the data construction process is available from authors upon request.   
 Japanese Patent Data.  Japanese patent data was obtained from PATOLIS, an 
on- line patent database maintained by the Japan Patent Information Organization 
(JAPIO).  These data are counts of patent applications by firm and year. 
U.S. Patent Data.  The data on patents taken out in the United States by Japanese 
firms were taken from the NBER Patent Database, described in Hall, Jaffe, and 
Trajtenberg (2001).  These data include counts of patent grants by firm and year, where 
the patents are dated by the year of application rather than the year of grant.  We also 
include a firm-specific measure of patent output that is “quality-adjusted” by counting 
subsequent citations received by these patents, as described in the text.   
 R&D data.  The overall R&D spending of individual Japanese firms are taken 
from several consecutive issues of the Kaisha Shiki Ho, published by Toyo Keizai, and 
the Nikkei Kaisha Joho, published by the Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha.  All R&D 
expenditure data was deflated by the R&D price index constructed by the Japanese 
Science and Technology Agency and reported in Gijutsu Yoran.   
 Other firm variables.  Data on firm sales and industry affiliation and are taken 
from various issues of the Japan Development Bank Corporate Finance Database.  Data 
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on the establishment of subsidiaries in the United States are taken from various issues of 
the publication Kaigai Kigyou Shinshutsu Souran, by Toyou Keizai.  Data on R&D 
alliances with U.S. firms are taken from the SDC joint ventures database.   
 Sample Selection Issues.  Firms were selected on the basis of availability of a 
sufficient quantity of R&D data and patent data in both Japan and the United States.  We 
further required that there be no major jumps in such series as capital stock over the 
course of the 1980s, thereby screening out firms involved in major domestic mergers or 
acquisitions.  This screening tends to over-sample R&D intensive firms relative to the 
population as a whole.  A handful of large R&D performers are omitted due to data 
irregularities.  A complete list of the firms in our sample and additional information on 
the sample are available from the authors upon request.   
